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Robert Pozen 
Thank you for inviting me to this very  august group of economists as 
one of the so-called industry representatives. I thought that it might be 
useful to look at some of the practical issues from our perspective in two 
main areas: the investment-management side and the service side. 
On the investment-management side, there are basically three main al- 
ternatives. You  can have centralized fund investing, you can have index 
funds, or you can have some sort of active management. On the first alter- 
native, I share many of the concerns that Martin Feldstein has articulated 
earlier in this meeting. I have been involved with the private administra- 
tion of various defined-benefit plans, and you would be surprised how 
much pressure is brought to bear on these plans even in the private sphere. 
The standard response to avoid these pressures is reliance only on index 
funds, but these also raise concerns. 
For the record, I want to say that Fidelity manages over $23 billion in 
retail index funds. We are the second biggest retail provider of index funds, 
so we are seriously involved with that aspect of money management. Nev- 
ertheless, I am actually quite concerned about a world in which huge num- 
bers of people and huge amounts of  money wind up in Standard and 
Poor’s 500 funds. There is a clear free-rider problem on active research 
posed by  index funds. They do not do any research on stocks or compa- 
nies, so they have no idea about whether the prices of stocks in the index 
are appropriate. Index funds basically rely on active managers to set ap- 
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propriate prices for index stocks: they are simply parasites living off  ac- 
tive research. 
This absence of  securities research-the  core characteristic of  index 
funds-raises  fundamental questions about their effect on the capital allo- 
cation function of  the stock market. If more and more index money is 
invested without looking at the stocks or the companies, then capital may 
not go to those companies that are the best users of that capital. Moreover, 
the popularity  of  the Standard and Poor’s  500 index tends to disfavor 
smaller and mid-size companies. For example, will there be a disparity in 
ability to raise capital between the 490th and the 510th company on the 
Standard and Poor’s list? It is easy to argue that we should simply shift to 
broader indexes, such as the Wilshire 5000. However, these broader  in- 
dexes have attracted relatively little investor interest or support. 
When I consider the alternative of active management, I am attracted 
by  the structure of the proposal from Fred Goldberg and Michael Graetz. 
Their proposal contemplates a default option for those who do not want 
to choose an active manager plus a “contract-out’’ procedure for those 
who want to use a private money manager. I support a strong default op- 
tion because it may be difficult to educate all citizens about the range of 
fund options. 
In thinking about how to design a low-cost, highly structured default 
option for those taxpayers who do not want to make investment choices, 
I would suggest that we look to what we call lifestyle funds. Lifestyle funds 
are ones where the mix of stocks and bonds changes automatically as the 
investor cohort ages. For example, when investors are twenty-five, the life- 
style fund has 80 percent stocks and 20 percent bonds; then, as they get 
to forty-five, the mix shifts to 40 percent bonds and 60 percent  stocks; 
and, as they get toward retirement, the mix shifts to a majority of bonds. 
Such lifestyle funds are much simpler than even the government thrift 
plan, which offers participants several options to choose from. 
I think that you need a strong default option because many members 
of  Congress seem quite concerned about whether all citizens will  know 
enough to make intelligent investment choices. With the lifestyle funds, 
we can meet these concerns-if  a citizen does nothing, then he or she will 
be given an appropriate mix of stocks and bonds, which will be changed 
automatically over time. 
As for the contract-out procedure for those who want to choose a pri- 
vate money manager, I would suggest that we use as a model the Depart- 
ment of Labor’s safe harbor under  section 404(c) of the Employee Re- 
tirement  Income  Security Act  (ERISA).  This  safe harbor  relieves  the 
employer of liability for specific investments chosen by participants if cer- 
tain conditions are met. Most important, a qualified investment manager 
must offer participants at least three different investment options. One 
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deposit or insurance account with guaranteed return. A second must be 
some type of high-quality bond fund. And the third must be some sort of 
diversified stock fund. Having three options is just the minimum; there 
can be more investment alternatives. Moreover, the safe harbor requires 
participants to receive educational materials about how to choose among 
these investment alternatives. 
I would  be concerned about a contract-out procedure that would  be 
thrown open to any vendor regardless of qualification and would allow a 
vendor to offer only one investment option (such as individual Venezuelan 
stocks). It is  this type of high-risk investment that is likely to produce 
political repercussions. By contrast, when you explain the 404(c) model to 
most people in Washington, they think that it is reasonable. It has the ad- 
vantage of being used successfully in the context of defined-contribution 
plans. 
Now, on the service side, I like the idea of having the IRS do as much 
as possible and using the present system for collecting social security con- 
tributions. However, I think that there still are a lot of questions about 
how often private money managers would receive contract-out monies and 
how they would actually get these monies. In my view, allowing a partici- 
pant to choose only one private manager and transferring the money only 
once per year are probably the two most important features in terms of 
cost drivers. Costs would be too high if a financial institution received $12 
a week, divided among four different mutual funds. A weekly contribution 
of $12 would equal $624 per year, which is close to 2 percent of the average 
social security contribution per year. 
I  think  that many people are underestimating the cost of  marketing, 
enrollment, and education for the contract-out procedure. On the other 
hand, if  we  have a system constructed with a default option, I am not at 
all worried if people wind up paying fees to investment managers that are 
higher than those currently charged by the federal thrift plan. Some inves- 
tors may want a broad range of investment options plus other extras and 
may very well be willing to pay more for these. I am not bothered by this 
possibility as long as we  have a strong default option and good disclosure 
by private money managers competing for contract-out business. 
Then we get to the cost of administrative servicing. Many fund sponsors 
provide a very high level of customer support-for  example, twenty-four- 
hour phone service, consolidated reports, and Internet tools. Problem res- 
olution itself is an expensive service. Again, I am not worried if  we  have 
a strong default option and good disclosure from a number of qualified 
financial institutions. If someone does not demand a lot of service and 
wants to pay very low fees, he or she can stay with the default option. If 
someone wants more services, then he or she can consider the cost-benefit 
trade-off offered by various private money managers. 
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social security, I think that it is a good idea to have something like a three- 
year transition for several reasons. One is that it will  take time for the 
government to build the new system and make all the proper connections 
to the old system. A transition period allows time to educate people about 
the available choices in the new system. A transition period also allows 
time for accounts to build up to a reasonable size. Given the number of 
young people who have part-time and summer jobs, you can have very 
small account sizes. I think that it might be useful to have a rule requiring 
a minimum account size of $2,000 or $5,000 before someone could con- 
tract out. Otherwise, it would be possible to have people invest $29 in a 
fund, which would not be economical. 
Joel M. Dickson 
A broad consensus has developed regarding the need to reform the U.S. 
social security system. As part of this national debate, numerous proposals 
have been advanced that would provide participants with the ability to 
direct  some of  their  social security investments through individual ac- 
counts. Unfortunately, to date, little attention has been given to the admin- 
istrative costs of running these new accounts. This conference will likely 
provide an important platform as administrative-cost considerations begin 
to be integrated with the design proposals. 
The costs of any particular  proposal will vary depending on its char- 
acteristics. However,  existing retirement-savings-plan options-namely, 
401(k)s and IRAs-can  provide some guidance on the costs of and trade- 
offs in servicing social security accounts. Record keeping for 401(k) plans 
is a very  transaction-intensive business where two different groups must 
be serviced: the plan sponsor and the participants. There are multiple pay 
periods  and multiple sources of funds (e.g., employee pretax contribu- 
tions, employee after-tax contributions, employer matching contributions) 
that must be tracked separately. There is also a lot of flexibility in plan 
design, making each plan unique in terms of investment choice, plan pro- 
visions, and required services. In short, a typical 401(k) plan’s costs are 
quite expensive. However, financial services firms have one important tool 
at their disposal: voluntary selection. Firms can decide whether they want 
to provide services for a given provider,  thereby targeting  those plans 
whose asset-based revenue can pay for its servicing costs. In a universal 
social security plan, providers would likely lose this ability to select their 
client base. 
Although there is no such thing as a typical 401(k) plan, some parame- 
ters can be placed around the major cost areas. Overall, servicing a 401(k) 
plan probably costs on the order of $100 per participant year, depending 
on the plan’s complexity and the range of services offered. A reasonable 
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estimate of  the servicing costs-that  is, the systems, staff, and array of 
services needed to interact with both the employer and the employee- 
may represent about 50 percent of that total cost. Another significant por- 
tion of the costs can be accounted for by transaction processing (e.g., plan 
contributions, exchanges, withdrawals, loans) and ongoing research and 
development of new services needed to attract and retain clients. All other 
plan expenses, including participant education, statement mailings, and 
miscellaneous other expenses, may account for just about 20 percent of 
the total cost. These costs simply represent the ongoing costs of servicing 
the accounts. One-time start-up costs would also need to be accounted for 
in any overall pricing model, and these marketing and plan conversion 
costs can be considerable. 
Providing services to an IRA is generally less complex and, hence, less 
costly than providing them to a 401(k) plan. With an IRA, a financial ser- 
vices provider is interacting with only one client-the  account owner. This 
relationship  is  less transaction  intensive, with  fewer reporting  require- 
ments than exist under the ERISA-based 401(k) structure. In addition, 
providers retain some ability to select their client base through the institu- 
tion of minimum account balances, account-maintenance fees for small 
accounts, and targeted marketing to “profitable” shareholders. Overall, 
ongoing servicing costs probably run about $30 per year. In addition, first- 
year costs associated with attracting a new account might represent an ad- 
ditional $40 in order to cover phone calls, account setup, and literature ful- 
fillment. 
The wide range of ongoing administrative costs within existing IRA and 
401(k) models provides the ability to identify areas of cost  savings. In 
particular, four general questions need to be addressed in evaluating the 
potential administrative costs of any individual account proposal: Who 
does the record keeping, who are the clients being serviced, how often are 
the accounts valued, and what are the types and frequency of allowable 
transactions by participants? 
Centralized or decentralized record keeping is probably the most im- 
portant issue to address. If it is determined that individual financial ser- 
vices companies should provide record-keeping services, the  reporting- 
requirements transaction  activity will  likely be more complex than with 
current IRAs. This would be especially true if firms would have to interact 
with both the employer and the employee. However, these accounts would 
probably be less complex than a 401(k) plan because it would be a more 
standardized program. With decentralized record keeping, administrative 
costs will  naturally be higher because thousands of different marketing, 
education, and advertising programs will  have to be developed and tai- 
lored to that particular institution. Service enhancements and the constant 
competition to retain and attract clients will also lead to generally higher 
costs. 
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structure, a reasonable assumption for a bare-bones model might be  an 
ongoing cost of $50 per participant year with decentralized record keep- 
ing. Given this figure, what are the business implications for providing 
these accounts? Consider an individual earning $30,000 in social security 
income (which is above the mean social security income level) with 2 per- 
cent contributed to an individual account, and assume that the first-year 
cost of establishing the account is $40. A low-cost provider charging ex- 
penses of thirty basis points (0.3 percent) would generate first-year reve- 
nue of about $1.80 (0.3 percent  X 2 percent X $30,000) but would incur 
costs of roughly $90. 
Under the commonly proposed 2 percent individual account model, 
the break-even period for this example would be nearly twenty-five years, 
assuming an 8 percent nominal return and a 5 percent real return. On a 
stand-alone basis, this is not a particularly attractive business proposition, 
especially if firms would not be able to choose their client base. In short, 
asset-based revenue would not cover operating costs unless other fees- 
like low balance fees-could  be used. Even if firms generated 1 percent in 
asset-based fees, the break-even period would still be on the order of  a 
decade. Two general conclusions can be drawn from this example. First, a 
number of providers might choose not to offer individual accounts if only 
2 percentage points of payroll taxes were used to fund the accounts be- 
cause of the substantial start-up costs. In addition, the firms for which the 
accounts would be the most attractive are those that can generate signif- 
icant asset-based revenue over a relatively short time horizon-that  is, 
higher-cost providers that, all else equal, would provide lower returns to 
the system’s participants. 
Costs could be  lowered dramatically by  adopting centralized record 
keeping, although this approach may also decrease investment flexibility 
and service development. In particular, with a single record-keeping sys- 
tem, significant economies of scale and scope are available. For example, 
there would be a need for only one coordinated education program and 
one set of marketing initiatives. In addition, error reconciliation is much 
simpler, and no conflicts would result from trying to move accounts be- 
tween different financial services providers. 
One way in which to reduce client-servicing costs would be to develop 
a way of getting either the employer or the employee out of the picture. 
Because the individual accounts would likely be owned and controlled by 
the employee, it might make sense to eliminate any employer involvement 
that is required in servicing the individual account. One approach might 
be to direct the individual account investment through an individual’s tax 
forms; that is, use the IRS as a conduit for account contributions. In this 
way, the account is based on social security wages, which are already de- 
tailed on individual w-2 forms, requiring no further employer involve- 
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keeping could lower costs by using the tax-filing process to allocate contri- 
butions. However, the combination of centralized record keeping and min- 
imal involvement by employers would dramatically lower overall costs. 
One often-overlooked consideration is the valuation period of the ac- 
count, which can significantly alter administrative-cost calculations. There 
are two general industry models: daily valuation and periodic valuation. 
With periodic valuation (e.g., monthly or quarterly), there is an overall 
trust account that represents the employer-sponsored plan and is recon- 
ciled on a regular basis. Participants own shares in the trust. This is  a 
fairly straightforward approach because all that is required is to reconcile 
the trust’s investments and then allocate this pool of money to participants 
on the basis of their ownership shares in the trust. 
Daily valuation works in the reverse direction. That is, the reconcilia- 
tion process begins by auditing each participant’s account on a daily basis. 
These individual accounts must then be aggregated and reconciled at the 
trust level. This is a much more complex and expensive process than peri- 
odic valuation. As a ballpark  estimate, monthly or quarterly valuation 
(and associated transaction  activity) would probably reduce administra- 
tive costs by one-quarter to one-third relative to daily valuation. However, 
this approach would make more sense with centralized record keeping 
and limited investment choice because much of the cost savings would be 
eliminated by  using existing mutual funds-which  are daily valued and 
subject to many different dividend-distribution schedules-in  a periodic 
Valuation system. 
The final area of potential cost savings would be in limiting transaction 
activity. Factors that would lower administrative costs would be limits on 
exchanges and contributions, no ability to make withdrawals before retire- 
ment or to take loans, and limited investment options. As with many of the 
other factors discussed, limited investment options probably work better 
within a centralized record-keeping framework. However, even without 
centralized record keeping, there are ways in which to limit transactions, 
such as limiting investment to a series of so-called lifestyle funds, as others 
have suggested. 
In summary, financial services firms have considerable experience man- 
aging individual accounts and understand many of the cost considerations 
needed to evaluate alternative proposals for social security reform. Al- 
though the key  decision might well  be  whether to employ centralized or 
decentralized record keeping for the accounts, there are many other fac- 
tors that would significantly affect overall administrative costs. In partic- 
ular, the number of  relationships needed to ensure the accuracy of the 
account  information,  the valuation frequency of  the accounts, and the 
degree of flexibility offered in terms of available services and transaction 
capability would all affect the costs associated with providing and servic- 
ing a social security system with individual accounts. 214  F.  Gregory Ahern 
F.  Gregory Ahern 
I would preface my  comments by  saying that the paper that was pre- 
sented earlier today by  Goldberg and Graetz is one that tracks some of 
the remarks that I was going to make, so, in the interest of not being re- 
petitive, I will offer only a few brief comments. 
First, the real challenge when you look at individual social security ac- 
counts is the fact that you are talking about a market that would ultimately 
be five times bigger than the 401(k) market is today. It would involve 140 
million individual accounts. At State Street, we have been actively involved 
with the issue of social security reform for a couple of years now. We have 
operated under a set of principles regarding what we think is relevant not 
only from a political standpoint-because  you have to build political sup- 
port-but  also from the national policy standpoint. The first of these is 
that you have to protect current retirees and the soon to be retired from 
benefit cuts. Any new program has to be phased in very gradually. 
Second, there are two big questions regarding individual accounts: Can 
they be made to work for low-income workers, and can you organize them 
in such a way  as to address the time lag between contributions and the 
crediting of individual accounts? We  think that there are acceptable an- 
swers to both these questions. Many of the ideas that look attractive to us 
at State Street have been touched on in the papers presented at this confer- 
ence. We think that a realistic program of individual accounts with some 
right of ownership requires a low-cost structure. We  also agree with the 
notion that the program will require a safety-net element (perhaps with a 
defined-benefit first-tier part) and keep survivor and disability benefits in- 
tact as well. 
Third, we  agree that you have to work off  the existing tax and data 
codes already available: the IRS/Treasury, Social Security Administration 
(SSA), or some combination of both. You need to use a centralized record 
keeper in order to make this work. And, more important, you need to 
keep it simple, particularly in the early years, whether you call it an incuba- 
tion account or a cash-balance account. The only realistic way in which to 
get individual accounts off  the ground is to be able to provide something 
that people can afford, at least in the initial years. An evolutionary model, 
which has been discussed here today, would involve a cash-balance ap- 
proach with unitized investment and ownership rights that really would 
have to be tracked back in the reconciliation process. That is, the money 
would remain in the cash-balance account until the payroll-tax receipts 
had been allocated to individual contributors. And, when that has been 
completed (which, in an ideal world, would be a year to eighteen months 
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but realistically might take even longer), the money could go into either 
an individual investment account with a lifestyle approach, modeled in a 
way  that is similar to what Bob Pozen was describing, or into a default 
option offering three basic funds. If you use the lifestyle model, then asset 
allocation would depend only on the age of the contributor. 
I think that the accounts need to reach a certain level either in terms of 
assets or in terms of age before you can allow people to roll out into a 
program with many vendors and a high level of service. Before doing this, 
the account system must be allowed to build up assets to a point at which 
costs as a fraction of assets are reasonable. If the basis-points approach 
for allocating costs is used, you want to be able to cross-subsidize smaller 
accounts without imposing exorbitant fees on larger accounts. You  also 
want to begin to add the bells-and-whistles service features that have be- 
come common in the 401 (k) business today. All  these features require a 
large asset base over which to spread costs. As the system matures, it could 
become similar to the 401(k) world with which we are all familiar today. 
What do I mean by starting simply? I am talking about one statement 
per year, no loans, as well as perhaps a single annual contribution, distri- 
bution only on death or retirement, and some reasonable way to manage 
call volume. At least in our experience, call volume is the single biggest 
driver in terms of costs after the education component. For example, if 
you established 140 million accounts tomorrow, a very conservative esti- 
mate is that you would have to handle 150-1 75 million inquiries per year. 
Even if  you are able to use Internet technology or some other automated 
system, that is still a staggering volume of calls and inquiries with which 
to deal. In terms of education, I assume that we  will rely on the govern- 
ment and the media to provide the bulk of the service, particularly in the 
beginning. The need for education and its cost can be mitigated to some 
degree by having the incubation-account approach, which really is auto- 
matic, as well as a simple default option. 
1 feel that allocating costs according to account assets (the basis-points 
approach) is the only way to go. In terms of total costs, you are looking 
at a minimum of $25-$30  per account, and that number could range up 
to $75-$100;  charging fees on the basis of total costs is just not going to 
work with this kind of  system. With the basis-points approach, you get 
the cross-subsidization effect, which has got political elements to recog- 
nize, but I think that it is probably the fairest way to go. And, as you know, 
from a seller’s standpoint, all participants get the same returns as long as 
they are in either the level  1 unitized account or a level 2 individual ac- 
count. 
To  summarize, individual accounts can be made to work; you need to 
begin simply, and you need to use an evolutionary approach. If you align 
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can make a really good case for evolving to the 401(k) model three to five 
years down the road. 
Frederick L. A. Grauer 
The U.S. social security system may be reformed in the near future. One 
change proposed is that participants in the system direct the investment 
of their social security account. Administrative costs of self-directed in- 
vesting,  such  as  accounting,  safekeeping, reporting,  phone  servicing, 
managing, and transacting, affect the design of the system itself. Under 
a budget constraint, the greater are these administrative costs, the fewer 
investment choices would  be  available. Since administrative costs may 
have substantial fixed costs and thus exhibit economies of scale, the opti- 
mal set of investment choices may be small. 
The discussions at the conference envision a social security system that 
is either defined benefit (DB), like the current system, or defined contribu- 
tion (DC), or a hybrid. Almost by definition, the investments behind a DB 
plan cannot be self-directed. Participant-directed investing is a feature of 
a DC system. A conventional DC system, under which benefits equal con- 
tributions plus (or minus) the participant’s investment success (or failure), 
cannot assure funding of a predefined benefit. If social security were con- 
verted entirely to a DC system, there would be no assured social safety net. 
If a hybrid is contemplated where a social safety net is provided in the 
form of a defined benefit and, in addition, a DC plan is also provided, the 
DB portion must be invested according to a policy designed to ensure 
funding of those benefits.’ The DC portion may be invested according to 
each participant’s policy. Of course, the need to reform the social security 
system arises in part because the investment policy currently followed does 
not ensure funding of  the defined benefit. Conversion to a DC system 
will not solve this problem. A social safety net and self-directed investing 
are incompatible. 
The administrative costs of investment choice are relevant if social secu- 
rity is to move in whole or in part to a DC system. 
Two comments are offered. First, the administrative costs of investment 
choice will be different depending on whether one is  building a system 
from scratch or modifying an existing system. The analyses offered at the 
conference have carefully examined the administrative-cost functions of 
large private-sector servicers of DC employee retirement plans. The con- 
clusions are of the form, If the social security system adopts the private- 
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sector administrative model, then the administrative costs of the system 
should approximate those of large private providers, which have been esti- 
mated to be in the range of 75-150  basis points of assets administered. 
The implicit assumption is that adoption of the private model involves 
either the replication (duplication) of an existing system or the allocation 
of all historical costs of the existing system if the existing system is used, 
including the costs of building it in the first place and the marketing costs 
of asset gathering. What has not been examined is the incremental cost of 
modifying existing systems to provide a social security subaccount. 
It is common practice for private providers to customize their systems 
to meet their customers’ needs. Costs of modifying existing systems will 
depend on the nature of the modifications. The modifications could be 
made quite standard across different systems if the SSA specified standard 
investment choices and standard interfaces to itself, the IRS, and payroll 
servicers. Simple and uniform standards would reduce the costs of modi- 
fication substantially. The true incremental administrative cost of a social 
security subaccount would be a fraction of the cost of building an existing 
system from scratch. As an added benefit, the integration of the social se- 
curity account into participants’ retirement reports can only enhance the 
quality of their retirement planning. At the conference, I suggested that 
the average incremental administrative cost at full funding of adding a so- 
cial security account to existing DC or IRA systems could be as low as 5 
basis points. This may be low, but surely 75-1  50 basis points for a redun- 
dant system is high. 
A problem exists with the modification approach-lack  of  universal 
coverage. Approximately 50 percent of working Americans are currently 
covered by DC plans and/or IRAs. Significant growth in coverage remains 
as DC-plan formations extend into the public sector and to companies 
with fewer than fifty employees. Over the next five years, covered Ameri- 
can workers should exceed 60 percent. 
Several low-cost approaches to expanding coverage must be considered. 
The simplest approach for those not covered by  a DC plan or an IRA 
would  be  to maintain  existing DB coverage under  social security-no 
change, no harm. Another approach would involve the creation of  a na- 
tional DC-investment-pooled account without participant direction that 
would have a more aggressive investment policy than social security cur- 
rently; that is, it would include stocks in its policy mix. Still another ap- 
proach would contemplate a DC account or an IRA equivalent to the 
so-called lifeline account used in the regulated utility industry to assure 
minimum service access for those not able to afford regular service. Such 
an approach should involve incentives for DC-plan  sponsors to extend 
coverage to nonemployees or financial institutions to create lifeline IRAs. 
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stantially reduced through modification rather than replication of existing 
private delivery systems. Cost-effective alternative approaches probably 
exist to address shortfalls in universal coverage. To hold modification (vs. 
replication) hostage to uniform universal coverage is tantamount to forced 
cross-subsidization. 
The second comment focuses on investment choice itself. If  the exis- 
tence of administrative costs implies limited investment choice, what are 
the best, limited choices to offer social security participants? This kind of 
question inevitably elicits heated debate. The existence of administrative 
costs forces the issue, however. 
The  last  fifty years  of  academic  research  has  witnessed  significant 
growth in investment wisdom. Markowitz (1 952) demonstrated the power 
of cross-sectional diversification to control risk and improve the reward- 
to-risk ratio on investments. Samuelson (1965) showed how intertemporal 
diversification reduced risk and why  buy-and-hold  investing dominates 
market timing. Sharpe (1991) emphasized that the costs of investing were 
the key  determinant of the average active investor underperforming the 
market-an  argument in favor of index funds. Brinson, Hood, and Bee- 
bower (1  986) showed that the  asset-allocation decision-the  choice of 
what  mixture of  stocks, bonds,  and cash to hold  in  a portfolio-"ex- 
plained" more than 90 percent of realized pension portfolio risk and re- 
turn. In other words, asset-class selection is more important than security 
selection for long-term portfolio performance. 
This wisdom suggests the desirable scope of investment choice within 
social security-a  set of low-cost, buy-and-hold, diversified stock, bond, 
and cash portfolios. What we cannot afford is high turnover, actively man- 
aged funds. Index funds would be appropriate; sector funds and funds that 
place big bets on a handful of stocks would not be allowed. 
These types of investment choices greatly simplify the question of what 
are the best investment options for the DC portion of social security. In- 
vestment choices limited to indexed stocks and bonds with infrequent 
trading intervals (yearly, perhaps) would dramatically lower administra- 
tive costs and significantly increase the prospects for investment perfor- 
mance over the long run. 
In summary, the incremental cost of modifying existing DC or IRA 
administrative systems to support a simple social security subaccount 
must be analyzed before committing to the replication of existing adminis- 
trative systems. Alternative approaches to the coverage of those not cov- 
ered under existing DC or IRA plans must be evaluated in order to deter- 
mine whether the cost-effective expansion of social security DC coverage 
is possible. Cross-subsidization should be avoided. Finally, both adminis- 
trative costs and investment performance are improved if we heed the in- 
vestment wisdom of our time: diversify within and across markets, invest 
for the long term, and mind costs. Panel Session: lndustry Perspectives  219 
Sham Mathews 
I prepared some formal remarks for today, but I will not use all of them 
because much of the substance has already been discussed in earlier ses- 
sions. Aetna has been analyzing these issues over the last twelve months 
primarily from the public policy side with a major consideration being a 
“customer perspective.” 
I should probably tell you a little about Aetna because, as I listened to 
the group talk  about other countries’ plans today, I realize that Aetna 
provides retirement plans in all these countries. We  are in Chile, Argen- 
tina, Mexico, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia (to name a few), and, 
in the United States, we  provide retirement plans for all the markets and 
tax codes. We do 401(k) business and are a very large player in the small 
to mid-size end of the business. We provide retirement plans for primary 
and secondary education and a lot of university systems and do a lot 
of work with governments and municipalities as well as some individual 
investment products: annuities, IRAs, and mutual funds. We sell products 
in two  structures: in a mutual fund structure, like all the folks around 
the table, but also in an annuityhnsurance wrapper for both retirement 
accumulation and payout. 
We  do a lot of things; we  have a lot of different customers and many 
different constituencies we  have to think about. Our president, Tom Mc- 
Inerney, has been very involved in the National Savers’ Summit. Working 
with a few  of you, he has spent a lot of  time on CSIS (the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies), and we  can keep coming back to a 
fundamental question: Isn’t  this all about a national  retirement policy? 
And we keep wanting to take the discussion back to the “three legs of the 
stool”: employer system, private savings, and social security. 
When we start to look at issues like private accounts, we  always ask this 
question: What problem are we trying to solve? And it is very hard some- 
times to have, in my opinion, a good debate around the private accounts 
without knowing what problem you are trying to solve. For example: Is 
this about program solvency? Or is this about transferring cost and risk to 
the private sector? Is it about expanded access? I have heard a few people 
today talk about piggybacking the employer system. Are we attempting to 
move retirement plans down to the smaller end of  the market? Or is  it 
some combination of all those things? An informed discussion ultimately 
involves making decisions around some of these questions. 
When we  talk to plan sponsors, as a few of you have suggested today, 
there are a lot of concerns, particularly in the 401(k) market. It is not 
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just about social security or getting involved in one more administrative 
responsibility as an employer. It is also about ERISA concerns; it is about 
fiduciary liability. In my  mind, given the capacity of payroll and record- 
keeping systems today, this liability question is as important to address as 
is the question of administration. How might this connect to the current 
regulatory system in the 401(k) market? I think that there is a lot of noise 
around administration because it is easier to understand. But, if you are 
the fiduciary or the trustee of a plan, you worry about this. That is what 
a lot of our employers say to us. At the same time, a lot of our plan par- 
ticipants tell us that they are concerned about the solvency of the social se- 
curity system. From a participant perspective, how do you restore some 
of the confidence in the system? 
And, last but not least, we do lots and lots of work with financial advis- 
ers who also are very interested in this issue. Whenever they talk to their 
customers about financial planning and savings for retirement, social se- 
curity is an integral part of these discussions and plays an important role 
in establishing a plan. 
So  there are lots of different issues from a constituency perspective. 
We  talked about the three model alternatives: working off the current tax 
system; individual directed accounts; and the employee-based system. In 
my mind, each of these has strengths and weaknesses that must be debated 
in the context of what problems we  are trying to solve. I believe that it is 
important to look at the strengths and weaknesses in the context of how 
we service our customers today. At Aetna, we break down the services that 
we  provide into six components: money collection, plan administration, 
participant record keeping, investment management, participant educa- 
tion, and participant services. We have already discussed today how much 
or how little of that you can choose to provide and how that affects the 
cost of providing service. Again, each of  the options for implementing 
private accounts has different effects on these service components. 
Without looking at every nuance, let us look at a couple of examples. 
We  talked earlier today about the option of “piggybacking” private ac- 
counts onto existing defined-contribution plans. All the companies here 
today already provide a great deal of participant education in support of 
the retirement plans that they provide to sponsors. In this regard, if private 
accounts were enacted, assuming that transitional and fiduciary concerns 
have been addressed, there is a possibility of leveraging operating struc- 
tures already in place for defined-contribution plans. This issue of educa- 
tion in the context of private accounts is very important as we find 70-80 
percent of our individual customers want information to help in planning 
for  retirement  and  making  the  appropriate  risk-adjusted  investment 
choices. One cannot overlook this need for help in establishing a system 
of  private accounts  because of  the potential  risk  of suboptimizing the 
long-term social objectives. 
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ministering small accounts, I have been struck by the discussion of making 
“once-a-year’’ deposits into individual accounts. Being a proponent of 
dollar cost averaging, I would suggest that you look at market returns over 
the last thirty years and consider what happens when you are out of the 
market the best thirty days over the last thirty years-a  huge difference 
in returns. 
The next thing that I would mention is that I think that the idea of using 
lifestyle accounts for individual accounts is interesting. One of the options 
that the Clinton administration has just put forth is a “negative election” 
option for 401(k) plans. Under negative election, the employer can decide 
that all employees will participate in the 401 (k) plan unless they expressly 
opt out. Some of our sponsors have actually used negative election in their 
plans and have used  our asset-allocation funds for these deposits. Also 
note  that asset-allocation funds cost more than indexing as it involves 
making certain sector-rebalancing decisions on a regular basis. But, as 
someone said earlier today,  80-90  percent  of returns come from asset- 
allocation decisions. 
In closing, I  believe that the amount of  choice that you give  people 
in terms of controlling their private accounts and/or making investment 
decisions has a lot to do with who bears the risk at the back-end or payout 
phase of the retirement account. If the account is going to continue to be 
linked to a concept of providing a minimum level of income (e.g., an annu- 
ity), this “safety-net’’ concept must be linked with the choices provided in 
establishing and managing private accounts. Otherwise, there is a risk that 
future balances will not reach the levels anticipated and/or necessary to 
meet the minimum income needs in retirement. 
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Peter Diamond began by emphasizing a point made by Shaun Mathews of 
Aetna-that  40 percent of investors are self-directed and that 60 percent 
of investors want or need investment advice. He next offered a correction 222  Discussion Summary 
of a point in Joel Dickson’s presentation. Dickson had performed a cal- 
culation of the expected costs to a financial institution of managing the 
individual account of a representative individual in which he assigned the 
individual an annual income of  $27,000-identified  as the median  in- 
come of workers covered by social security. Diamond pointed out that the 
$27,000 was a mean, not a median, figure and that the relevant number for 
the purposes of Dickson’s calculation was actually mean covered earnings, 
which is $23,000. Dickson remarked that this change would support his 
point even more strongly. Diamond then suggested that the administrative 
cost figures from Dickson’s presentation ($50 per participant year and $40 
for initial setup) could be reconciled with Diamond’s own $150 per partici- 
pant year figure. His argument proceeded in several steps: 
First, he noted that Dickson’s costs included only record keeping, com- 
munication, and advertising and did not include fund management. Dia- 
mond  suggested that fund management would add $10 per participant 
year. Dickson and Estelle James argued that this may not be the case, ob- 
serving that $10 extra in costs may not translate into $10 extra in fees. 
Second, Diamond observed that charges for adjustments necessitated by 
divorce were not included in Dickson’s calculations but that they should 
be. He argued that, in any mandatory national individual account system, 
divorce-adjustment rules would likely be built into the charges and would 
not be up to the discretion of the fund manager. Dickson countered that 
this would likely be a small effect. He argued that, under a national, stan- 
dardized system of mandatory individual accounts, provisions for divorce 
would be simple to administer. He noted that divorce is complicated for 
401(k)s  largely  owing  to  the  heterogeneity  of  401(k)  accounts.  Any 
domestic-relations order that has to be qualified for a 401(k) under ERISA 
has to be qualified under the specific plan to which it is  to be applied. 
Dickson argued that this would not be an issue under a national, standard- 
ized plan. 
Finally, Diamond ventured that Vanguard has lower costs than the aver- 
age investment-management firm and that therefore we  should view Dick- 
son’s cost estimates as below the likely average cost of administering indi- 
vidual accounts. He suggested that, if the ratio of industry average charges 
to Vanguard’s charges is multiplied by the $60 per participant year figure, 
it would likely bring the figure up to roughly $100-still  below his estimate 
of $150 but much closer than Dickson’s original $50 figure. Dickson coun- 
tered that there is  a difference between costs and charges and that, al- 
though Vanguard’s charges were lower than average, their costs are likely 
not significantly different from average. Diamond recognized the distinc- 
tion and argued that his adjustment to Dickson’s figures to bring them up 
to industry average was still valid for charges. 
Martin Feldstein raised two questions regarding Robert Pozen’s discus- 
sion of a two-tiered system of individual accounts with a default option Discussion Summary  223 
and a more expensive plan for those who choose to opt out of the default 
option. Feldstein wondered (1) what would be the nature of the mecha- 
nism for collecting the extra fees from individuals in the “opt-out plan” 
and (2) whether people in the opt-out plan would enjoy a government 
guaranteekafety net on their returns (as individuals in a default plan are 
likely to enjoy under a politically feasible privatization proposal)? On the 
first point, Pozen noted that a centralized collection mechanism already 
exists. Discussion of the second point centered around what type of gov- 
ernment guaranteelsafety net, if any, should and/or would accompany the 
individual accounts. Pozen noted that his conception of the individual 
accounts did not include a government guarantee of returns at all, whether 
in the default option or in the opt-out plan. Further, he envisioned that 
individuals choosing the opt-out plan would receive a lower defined bene- 
fit (i.e., a pay-as-you-go benefit) than they would had they stayed in the 
default plan. Feldstein  argued that, on the basis of the current discussions 
in  Washington, it was possible that politically feasible reform options 
would have to include some form of government guarantee, perhaps a 
guarantee of a certain level of  “all-in’’ social security benefits-that  is, 
on the combined defined-benefit and defined-contribution amount. Estelle 
James  argued that guaranteeing individuals who opt out would introduce 
a significant moral hazard problem. Feldstein  countered that, nonetheless, 
a good deal of the politics involved in making individual accounts accept- 
able revolves around being able to guarantee that individuals will  do at 
least as well  under the reformed system as they would have under the 
status quo. Pozen opined that, if this is the political reality, the system will 
work only if  the guarantee is applied only to the default package and if 
the default package is made very conservative. Individuals who opt out 
would forfeit their guarantee, and they must take that into account when 
deciding to opt out. 
Robert Pozen argued that, in order to make the two-tiered approach 
(i.e., a default option and an opt-out plan, as specified above) most effec- 
tive, it would be critical not to bundle the default accounts with 401(k)s. 
Keeping the low-cost, standardized default option separate from the opt- 
out plan, he suggested, would make a government guarantee (on the de- 
fault tier only) more fcasible. In addition, the availability of a low-cost 
default option would likely reduce the perceived need for regulation of 
fees and costs in the opt-out plan. That is, given that individuals have the 
option of staying in a very low-cost, guaranteed default plan, they should 
not be prohibited from going outside the plan and spending more money 
on  a less restricted account.  Martin Feldstein noted  that the counter- 
argument to this position is that clever advertising  will lure innocent people 
to give up their guarantee and move into an opt-out plan with high fees; 
the individuals will invest badly and end up with only the pay-as-you-go 
piece at retirement, which is only a fraction of what they otherwise would 224  Discussion Summary 
have received. Consequently, the argument goes, the opt-out plans ought 
to be subject to regulation regarding allowable types of investment. Pozen 
pointed  out  that  this  type  of  regulation  is  already  embodied  in  the 
“404(c)” model, which mandates that the account manager provide at least 
three highly diversified investment options (a money market fund, a bond 
fund, and a stock fund), provide investor education,  and meet various 
other requirements in order to be a “qualified provider.” Feldstein won- 
dered whether it might not be possible to extend the government guaran- 
tee to the opt-out plan if  it were to operate under a 404(c)-type model. 
But Pozen argued that there would still be enough choice and risk to cause 
a serious moral hazard problem. John Shoven concurred, noting that, even 
under the 404(c) model, a government guarantee would essentially subsi- 
dize equity investment. Kent Smetters suggested that applying different tax 
rates to the different accounts could offset this effective subsidy. Estelle 
Jumes and Shoven replied that this would be quite complicated. 
Estelle James commented that the concern that a large percentage of 
the individual accounts would be extremely small during the initial period 
after reform may not be a serious problem, given that it would take several 
years for the necessary supporting systems (e.g., information systems) to 
be developed as well. She estimated that the development and implemen- 
tation of information systems would take at least three to five years. Dur- 
ing this time, accounts would be growing, and individuals could begin to 
think about and learn about different investment options. She also ques- 
tioned Fred Grauer regarding the assumptions underlying his presenta- 
tion and his claim that administrative costs for individual accounts could 
be  as low  as five  basis points per account. Specifically, she questioned 
the compatibility of his assumptions that (1) many costs could be kept low 
by  “piggybacking” (i.e., utilizing the infrastructure  of existing defined- 
contribution and IRA systems for communications, record keeping, and 
disbursement of funds) and (2) custodial and managerial costs would be 
extremely low (based on the experience of the federal TSP). James sug- 
gested that the second assumption relies on maintaining a very small num- 
ber of large pools while the first assumption implies many pools (associ- 
ated with employers), some of which are small. Grauer agreed, noting that 
he envisioned approximately three types of funds (stock, bond, and cash) 
that every defined-contribution plan would offer. But James argued that 
there would  be  additional internal  administration  and communication 
costs that Grauer had not figured in, with respect to setting up and main- 
taining this new system. 
James Poterba posed two questions to the panel regarding costs in the 
401(k) market. First, he asked whether total costs to 401(k) participants 
had been  rising recently, citing anecdotal and journalistic  evidence that 
suggested such a trend. Poterba noted that the cost figures being discussed 
at the conference seemed lower than the figures he had heard from various Discussion Summary  225 
sources. Second, he asked whether there was  a substantial difference in 
the average cost to participants in 401(k)s versus the costs of the marginal 
people currently coming into the system as it expands to a universal struc- 
ture. He conjectured that some of the small firms that have recently come 
into the 401 (k) market resembled less sophisticated, lower-income inves- 
tors who would be brought into the system if it were to expand under a 
system of social security individual accounts. 
Regarding the second question, Robert Pozen noted that financial insti- 
tutions are currently offering to smaller firms a highly standardized and 
simple 401(k) option that is the type of cost model that he would suggest 
using for less sophisticated investors under  a system of individual ac- 
counts. Pozen also noted, however, that detailed data do not yet exist on 
the trading-behavior or customer-service needs of these smaller firms rela- 
tive to the total 401(k) population. Regarding the first question, Pozen 
pointed out that a significant driver of increased cost in 401(k)s has been 
increased demand for services and greater flexibility on the part of em- 
ployers. He suggested that this escalation in demand for greater services 
has been quite substantial and that, in particular, large employers exert 
significant bargaining pressure to increase their level of services. Estelle 
James wondered why the firms do not bargain for lower fees. Pozen replied 
that they do bargain for lower fees but that benefits executives are espe- 
cially concerned with delivering expanded services to their constituents. 
Martin Feldstein pointed out the implicit principal-agent issue in this dy- 
namic-the  benefits manager gets credit for delivering greater service but 
perhaps is not penalized for a slight increase in fees. Joel Dickson noted 
that mutual fund managers are prohibited by  law from offering different 
fees to different customers but agreed that administrative fees for 401 (k) 
management can differ and that, once fees are driven down to virtually 
zero, negotiations necessarily turn to other issues, such as services. Skaun 
Mathews commented that, in the small business market (fewer than one 
hundred  lives),  in  which  Aetna  does  most  of  its  retirement  business, 
retirement-plan costs are extremely small relative to the costs of other ben- 
efits programs, such as health care plans. Therefore, a slightly higher fee 
is  not likely to seem an onerous burden in return for a higher level  of 
service. He noted that, on average, Aetna offers these clients plans with a 
choice of  six to twelve  funds, of which the average participant  chooses 
three or four, and 80 percent of participants call for customer service once 
per year or less. According to Mathews, Aetna’s cost for administering 
such a plan is seventy to one hundred basis points, including distribution 
costs and taking into account the fact that some of the funds are active 
management (i.e., not index) funds. 
Robert Pozen suggested that perhaps we  should be concerned about the 
volume of funds that would be funneled into index funds under a social 
security system with individual accounts. He noted that, currently, compa- 226  Discussion Summary 
nies added to the Standard and Poor’s 500 get an immediate premium as 
a result of the high volume of investment already being diverted into index 
funds. Martin Feldstein suggested that, eventually, active investors would 
arbitrage this premium away.  Pozen cautioned that we  do not know the 
level of investment in index funds at which this trend begins to be a prob- 
lem. Joel Dickson countered that Vanguard currently estimated net cash 
flow to index funds to be negative as a result of defined-benefit plans tak- 
ing money out, despite the large inflow from defined-contribution plans. 